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Abstract 
 
We employ interactive quantile regressions to assess conditional linkages between foreign 
aid, iron ore exports and terrorism from a panel of 78 developing countries for the period 
1984-2008. The following main findings are established.  First, it is primarily in the countries 
with the highest level of iron ore exports that terrorism affects exports. Second, bilateral aid 
has an impact on iron ore exports, while the evidence for such a relationship between 
multilateral aid and iron ore exports is limited. Third, there is limited support for the main 
hypothesis motivating this line of inquiry, notably that foreign aid can be used to mitigate a 
potentially negative effect of terrorism on resource exports. The results suggest that bilateral 
aid is more relevant at mitigating the negative effects of domestic and total terrorism on iron 
ore exports. 
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1. Introduction 
 The world is witnessing one of the greatest challenges to peace and shared prosperity. 
According to the June 2015 Global Peace Index (GPI) report, the number on internally 
displaced persons recorded between 2008 and 2014 has been the highest since the Second 
World War. According to Anderson (2015), 13.4% of Global GDP was lost in 2014 to 
fighting global terrorism and violence related concerns. The substantial percentage of GDP 
represents the combined GDP of Canada, Brazil, Spain, the United Kingdom and Germany. 
Consistent with Asongu and Kodila-Tedika (2015a), the report argues that terrorist activities 
are likely to substantially increase in the coming years because terrorist-related killings have 
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soared by more than 61% in 2014 from 2008. Compared to developed countries, developing 
nations are more severely affected by the scourge. Moreover, the April 2015 World Bank 
report has revealed that many developing countries have not yet attained the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) extreme poverty target
1
. 
 Against the above background, an evolving stream of recent literature is being 
increasingly devoted to assessing mechanisms by which terrorism and conflicts can been 
attenuated. As far as we have reviewed, the documented channels have included, the roles of: 
transparency (Bell et al., 2014); rule of law (Choi, 2010); learning (Brockhoff et al., 2014), 
especially in terms of bilingualism (Costa et al., 2008) and lifelong experiences (Asongu & 
Nwachukwu, 2016); press freedom or positive use of media (Hoffman et al., 2013); best 
governance tools in the fight against conflicts (Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 2016); 
understanding behavioural intentions motivating terrorism (Gardner, 2007); use of military 
tactics and strategies (Feridun & Shahbaz, 2010); role of global warming (Price & Elu, 2016) 
and horizons for common policies in the prediction of future regional conflicts  (Asongu & 
Nwachukwu, 2015a) and battle against terrorism (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2015b).  
 There is another stream of the literature that has been oriented towards nexuses 
between political instability, terrorism, violence, crimes and macroeconomic variables. Some 
orientations in this interesting literature have entailed, inter alia: (i) the effect of terrorism on 
foreign direct investment (FDI) (Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2008) and the role of development 
assistance in mitigating the potentially negative incidence of terror on FDI (Bandyopadhyay 
et al., 2014), contingent on domestic corruption-control levels (Efobi et al., 2015) or FDI 
thresholds (Asongu et al., 2015); (ii) linkages between terrorism and economic prosperity, 
with unidirectional (Piazza, 2006; Gaibulloev & Sandler, 2009;  Öcal & Yildirim,   2010; 
Meierrieks & Gries,  2013; Cho, 2015) and bidirectional causalities (Gries et al., 2011; 
Shahbaz et al., 2013;  Shahzad et al., 2015); (iii) the relationship  between terrorism and 
innovation (Koh, 2007) and (iv) the interplay of terrorism with natural resources (Humphreys, 
2005). This present study is closest to the fourth (iv) and first (i) streams. In essence, this line 
of inquiry aims to examine the role of development assistance in mitigating the potentially 
negative impact of terrorism on iron ore exports.  On the one hand, the positioning of the 
inquiry fits the first steam because it uses foreign aid as a policy variable that can dampen the 
                                                          
1
 According to the April 15
th
 World Bank publication on attainment of the MDG extreme poverty target (of 
halving poverty in 2015 from 1990), many developing countries still have a long way to go before reaching the 
extreme poverty target (Caulderwood, 2015; World Bank, 2015; Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 2015b).  
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effect of terrorism on economic activity. On the other hand, the positioning also fits the fourth 
stream because it is focused on natural resources.  
 Consistent with the underlying trade-terrorism literature (Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 
2015a), studies linking terrorism to trade can be classified into three principal themes, 
notably: the incidence of terrorism on trade; effect of illegal trade on terrorism and pitfalls in 
the modelling of the relationship. Four main studies are noteworthy in the first strand on the 
impact of terrorism on trade. They are:  (1) Security measures administered in the United 
States after the 11
th
 of September 2001 terrorist attacks; essential to mitigate the unappealing 
effects of terrorism on world trade (Richardson, 2004), (2) Nitsch and Schumacher (2004) 
have examined the impact of terrorism and welfare on trade by employing an augmented 
gravity model on 200 nations for the period 1960-1993. Using a plethora of violence, bilateral 
trade and terrorism variables, the authors conclude that trade openness is negatively affected 
by terrorism. Moreover, doubling incidents of terrorism reduces the underlying trade by about 
4 percent and (3) The connection between ‘nearness to the source of terror’ and negative 
effects on trade has been assessed by De Sousa et al. (2009a) who have concluded that there is 
a (i) need to carefully work-out a theory that elicits relationships between trade, transnational 
terror and policies of security and (ii) the importance of engaging more robust investigations 
on terrorism spillovers to differing definitions of neighbouring incidents and relationships. (4) 
De Sousa et al. (2009b) have gone further to examine the effect of international terrorism 
diffusion on trade and security. The motivation for the empirical underpinning is the 
assumption that nearness to the source of terror is negatively related to corresponding 
spillover effects. The core motivation underlying the line of inquiry is that measures of 
security which influence trade affect neighbouring countries and the source-country 
simultaneously. Conversely, countries that are located far-off from the source of terror could 
have positive rewards from trade by reaping ‘trade benefits’ corresponding to  the ‘loss of 
trade’ by the country hosting the terror and neighbouring nations experiencing negative trade 
externalities from the underlying terror. Three principal results are established, notably: (i) 
there is a direct negative effect of transnational terrorism on trade; (ii) with terror remoteness, 
trade increases and (iii) a negative effect of terror indirectly affects neighbouring countries 
from the source-country of terror.  
 Concerning the second stream on the impact of illegal trade on terrorism, two main 
studies are noticeable in the sparse literature. These studies have been primarily focused on 
illicit trade. (1) Piazza (2011) has assessed the nexus between ‘drugs trade’ and terrorism to 
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establish that cocaine production, illicit drugs and opiate considerably fuel terrorism activities 
(domestic and transnational). On the other hand, the eradication of illicit crops and banning of 
drugs have opposite effects. (2) Piazza (2012) extends the underlying study by investigating 
the relationship between ‘opium trade’ and terrorism in 34 Afghan provinces for the period 
1996-2008, employing binomial regressions. The author concludes that in provinces where 
opium is substantially cultivated, high rates of terrorist attacks are apparent. Therefore, the 
direction of causality is established to be flowing from the production of opium to terrorism. 
In the third strand, modelling issues have been discussed after a survey of the literature 
by Mirza and Verdier (2008). Four principal pitfalls are articulated from a plethora of studies 
on the nexus between trade and terrorism, namely the need to: (i) control for omitted variables 
which could most probably be linked to trade and terrorism; (ii) recognise the inter-temporal 
persistence of terror; (iii) distinguish between the effect of incidental country-specific 
incidences of terrorism from the impact of occurrences that are oriented towards the source-
country and (iv) account for endogeneity.  
 Noticeably, the above literature leaves room for extension in at least four main 
dimensions, notably the need to: (i) control for more terrorism indicators; (ii) explore linkages 
between foreign policy indicators in the terrorism-trade nexus; (iii) consider specific trade 
openness dimensions like resource exports and (iv) adopt robust empirical strategies that 
account for initial levels of the dependent variable.  
First, consistent with a caution advanced by Choi (2015) on the need to explore more 
variables when investigating the relationship between macroeconomic indicators and 
terrorism, we consider a plethora of terrorism variables in order to improve room for more 
policy implications, namely unclear, domestic, transnational and total terrorism. The adoption 
of these terrorism indicators is consistent with recent literature on the relationship between 
terrorism and macroeconomic variables (Efobi et al., 2015; Asongu et al., 2015; Asongu & 
Kodila-Tedika, 2015a). This adoption is also in line with the engaged trade-terrorism 
literature because some studies have focused only on a few variables, particularly (i) 
transnational terrorism (De Sousa et al., 2009ab) on the one hand and (ii) on the other hand 
transnational and domestic terrorism (Piazza, 2011).  
 Second, in a bid to improve space of policy directions, we are in accordance with the 
strand of literature which has used development assistance as a policy indicator in reducing 
the potentially negative impacts of terrorism on FDI (Bandyopadhyay et al., 2014; Efobi et 
al., 2015; Asongu et al., 2015). Hence, we steer clear of the engaged terrorism-trade literature 
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by employing a foreign aid policy indicator in the terrorism-‘iron ore exports’ linkage. The 
motivation for this deviation from the underlying literature is that foreign aid can reduce the 
potentially negative consequences of terrorism on trade. Moreover, motivated by the Choi 
(2015) recommendation (on the imperative for more policy variables), two main foreign aid 
variables are employed to avail room for more policy implications, notably: bilateral and 
multilateral aid. Based on the established evidence that terrorism reduces trade openness 
(Richardson, 2004; De Sousa et al., 2009ab), the intuition for involving development 
assistance is essentially to investigate whether foreign aid can reduce a hypothetically 
negative ‘iron ore exports’-terrorism nexus.  
 Third, it is relevant to emphasise on trade-specific macroeconomic elements. 
Therefore, as opposed to the stream of studies discussed above, we narrow-down the 
perspective on iron ore exports from the broad trade openness investigated by Asongu and 
Kodila-Tedika (2015). We lay emphasis on natural resources because the recent growth 
resurgence in most developing countries has been established to be resource-driven 
(Amavilah, 2015). Therefore, we employ an export-specific trade category: (i) following 
Piazza (2011, 2012) and (ii) opposed to Nitsch and Schumacher (2004), Richardson (2004) 
and De Sousa et al. (2009ab).   
 Fourth, motivated by the caution of Mirza and Verdier (2008) on the need for more 
robust empirical underpinnings, we adopt an estimated technique that is robust to outliers. 
Moreover, the adopted Qauntile regression technique also enables us to distinguish between 
initial levels of iron ore exports. In essence, blanket policies may not be effective unless they 
are contingent on initial levels of ‘iron ore exports’ and tailored distinctly across high- and 
low-‘iron ore exports’ countries.  
 In the light of the above, the present line of inquiry attempts to fill the gap left in the 
literature by assessing the role of foreign aid in reducing the hypothetically negative impact of 
terrorism on iron ore exports using quantile regressions.  Foreign aid which is used as a policy 
variable is expected to dampen the potentially negative relationship that terrorism has on iron 
ore exports. It is logical to expect foreign aid to weaken the negative effect of terrorism on 
development externalities in recipient countries (including trade in terms of iron ore exports) 
because foreign aid is theoretically designed to increase economic output by bridging the 
saving-investment gap in poor countries (Easterly, 1999). Iron ore exports are part of 
economic output. We do not consider specific relationships between types of terrorism and 
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iron ore exports. We broadly assume that terrorism (regardless of type) negatively affects an 
economic activity like iron ore exports
2
. 
  The empirical evidence is based on 78 developing countries with data for the period 
1984-2008. The motivation for focusing on developing countries and the underlying 
periodicity is at least threefold. First and foremost, as documented by Gaibulloev and Sandler 
(2009), the negative macroeconomic consequences of terrorism are more visible in 
developing countries, compared to advanced economies. This is essentially because 
accordingly to Gaibulloev and Sandler (2009), the former set of countries lack the 
technological, financial and logical mechanisms needed to absorb corresponding negative 
externalities linked to terrorism. Second, foreign aid is channelled from developed to 
developing countries. Therefore, the analytical scope should be the latter set of countries. 
Third, a motivation of the present inquiry is also to compare corresponding findings with the 
stream of FDI literature that has used the same periodicity and sample, namely: 
Bandyopadhyay et al. (2014), Efobi et al. (2015) and Asongu et al. (2015).   
 The rest of the study is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the data and 
methodology.  The empirical results, discussion and implications are covered in Section 3. 
Section 4 concludes with future research directions. 
 
2. Data and Methodology 
2.1 Data 
 We assess a panel of 78 developing countries with data for the period 1984-2008. 
Justifications for the choice of periodicity and sample have already been provided in the 
introduction. The sample that consists of three-year non-overlapping intervals is from 
Bandyopadhyay et al. (2014) and Efobi et al. (2015)
3
. The variables are originally from (i) the 
                                                          
2
 It is important to note that ‘iron ore exports’ can be affected by other factors like: (i) disappointing trade from 
steel importers and (ii) tightening of credit to steel mills (see Forbes, 2014).  
 
3 The adopted countries include: “Albania, Costa Rica, India, Namibia, Syria, Algeria, Cote d’Ivoire, Indonesia, 
Nicaragua, Tanzania, Angola, Dominican Republic, Iran, Niger, Thailand, Argentina, Ecuador, Jamaica, Nigeria, 
Togo, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan, Trinidad and Tobago, Bangladesh,  El Salvador, Kenya, Panama, 
Tunisia, Bolivia, Ethiopia, Lebanon, Papua New Guinea, Turkey, Botswana, Gabon, Libya, Paraguay, Uganda, 
Brazil, Gambia, Madagascar, Peru, Uruguay, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Malawi, Philippines, Venezuela, Cameroon, 
Guatemala, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Vietnam, Chile, Guinea, Mali, Senegal, Yemen, China, Guinea-Bissau, 
Malta, Sierra Leone, Zambia, Colombia, Guyana ,Mexico, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Congo, D. Republic, Haiti, 
Morocco, Sri Lanka, Congo Republic, Honduras, Mozambique and Sudan”. 
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Global Terrorism Database, (ii) World Development indicators of the World Bank and (iii) 
terrorism incidents from Enders et al. (2011) and Gailbulloev et al. (2012).  
 The dependent variable is iron ore exports.  In accordance with Asongu and Kodila-
Tedika (2015a), independent variables of interest are terrorism indicators (domestic, unclear, 
transnational and total terrorisms) and foreign aid variables (multilateral and bilateral aids). 
Terrorism is defined in this study as the actual and threatened use of force by subnational 
actors with the purpose of employing intimidation to meet political objectives (Enders & 
Sandler, 2006). The terrorism variables account for the number of yearly terrorism incidents 
registered in a country. In order to prevent mathematical concerns related to log-transforming 
zeros on the one hand and correct of the positive skew in the data, the study takes the natural 
logarithm of terrorism incidents by adding one to the base. This transformation approach is 
consistent with recent literature (Choi & Salehyan, 2013; Bandyopadhyay et al., 2014). 
Terrorism-specific definitions are from Efobi et al. (2015, p. 6). Domestic terrorism “includes 
all incidences of terrorist activities that involve[s] the nationals of the venue country: 
implying that the perpetrators, the victims, the targets and supporters are all from the venue 
country” (p.6). Transnational terrorism is “ terrorism including those acts of terrorism that 
concern[s] at least two countries. This implies that the perpetrator, supporters and incidence 
may be from/in one country, but the victim and target is from another”.  Unclear terrorism is 
that, “which constitutes incidences of terrorism that can neither be defined as domestic nor 
transnational terrorism” (p.6). Total terrorism is the sum of domestic, transnational and 
unclear terrorisms. 
Contrary to the independent variables of interest on which this inquiry  is based, the 
control variables help to ascertain some expected relationships between the outcome variable 
and other factors (institutional and macroeconomic). The control variables are: Trade 
openness, exchange rate, infrastructure, political globalisation, inflation, and internal 
conflicts. These control variables are consistent with underlying FDI-terrorism literature. 
From our expectations, infrastructural development, exchange rate improvement and trade 
openness should exert positive impacts on resource exports (Akpan, 2014; Asongu, 2015), 
whereas, internal/civil conflicts and inflation should have the opposite effect. These expected 
correlations are based on intuition and empirical literature.  Accordingly, high exchange rates 
have been established to stimulate exports, especially in developing countries (Rodrik, 2008). 
High inflation is expected to decrease the volume of iron ore exports because of greater 
economic uncertainty. The reason for this negative effect is that high inflation reflects a 
9 
 
negative economic outlook and investors have been documented to prefer strategies of 
investment that are void of ambiguity (Le Roux and Kelsey, 2015ab). We cannot establish the 
expected sign of ‘political globalisation’ a priori because its effect depends considerably on 
leverage in the international ‘decision-making’ processes (Asongu, 2014a).  Definitions of 
discussed variables are provided in Table 1. 
The summary statistics of the variables are provided in Table 2. The purpose of the 
correlation matrix provided in the appendix is to assess and prevent potential issues of 
multicollinearity between non-interactive variables. Contrary to linear additive models, in 
interactive models the issue of multicollinearity is not a concern between interactions and 
constituent variables (foreign aid and terrorism) (Brambor et al., 2006). However, we are not 
involving more than two sets of interactive variables under the same specification. In other 
words,  whereas multicollinearity is not an issue when it comes to interactive variables (i.e: 
interactive terms and their constituents), we are concerned about multicollinearity between 
specific components of interactive terms. Hence, only one aid variable and one terrorism 
variable can be employed in a given interactive specification.   
 
Table 1: Definitions and Sources of Variables 
    
Variables Signs Definitions Sources 
    
Iron Ore Export IOExp Ln. Iron Ore Export (as a % of Merchandise Exports)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bandyopadhyay 
et al. (2014) 
and Efobi et al. 
(2015) 
   
Trade Openness  LnTrade Ln. of Exports plus Imports of Commodities (% of GDP) 
   
Infrastructure  LnTel  Ln. of Number of Telephone lines (per 100 people) 
   
Inflation  LnInflation Ln. of Consumer Price Index (% of annual) 
   
Exchange rate LnXrate  Ln. of  Exchange rate (local currency per USD) 
   
Bilateral Aid  LnBilaid Ln. of Bilateral aid, net disbursement (million USD) 
   
Multilateral Aid  LnMulaid Ln. of Multilateral aid, net disbursement (million USD) 
   
Domestic terrorism Domter Number of Domestic terrorism incidents 
   
Transnational 
terrorism 
Tranater Number of Transnational terrorism incidents 
 
   
Unclear terrorism  Unclter Number of terrorism incidents whose category in unclear 
   
Total terrorism  Totter Total number of terrorism incidents  
   
Political 
globalisation 
LnPolglob  Ln. of  Index of political globalisation  
   
Internal conflicts  Civcon Index of  internal civil conflicts  
    
GDP: Gross Domestic Product. WDI: World Development Indicators.  
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Table 2: Summary Statistics  
      
 Mean S.D Minimum Maximum Obs 
      
Iron Ore Exports (ln) 0.698 2.120 -10.495 4.486 511 
      
Trade Openness (ln) 4.118 0.534 2.519 5.546 612 
      
Infrastructure (ln) 1.475 1.017 0.091 4.031 616 
      
Inflation (ln) 2.414 1.384 -3.434 9.136 581 
      
Exchange rate (ln) 2.908 3.870 -22.121 21.529 618 
      
Bilateral Aid (ln) 5.181 1.286 0.765 8.362 602 
      
Multilateral Aid (ln) 4.163 1.518 -1.249 7.105 600 
      
Domestic terrorism 14.292 45.179 0 419.33 624 
      
Transnational terrorism 2.316 6.127 0 63 624 
      
Unclear terrorism 1.972 7.479 0 86 624 
      
Total terrorism 18.581 55.595 0 477.66 624 
      
Political globalisation (ln) 4.036 0.301 2.861 4.530 624 
      
Internal conflicts 0.965 1.906 0 10 615 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation. Obs: Observations. 
 
2.2 Methodology  
Following the underlying literature on conditional determinants (Billger & Goel, 
2009) and more specifically recent terrorism-FDI studies (Asongu et al., 2015) in order to 
assess if initial levels of iron ore exports matter in the interactions of ‘foreign aid and 
terrorism’, we employ the quantile regression (QR) approach. It consists of investigating the 
determinants of iron ore exports throughout their conditional distribution (Keonker & 
Hallock, 2001). 
Previous studies in the FDI-terrorism (Bandyopadhyay et al., 201; Efobi et al., 2015) 
and trade-terrorism (Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 2015a) literature have reported parameter 
estimates at the conditional mean of the dependent variable. Whereas mean impacts are 
relevant, we extend the underlying literature by employing QR to distinguish between initial 
levels of iron ore exports. For example, while Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) assumes that the 
dependent variable and error terms are distributed normally, the QR approach is not based on 
the assumption of error  terms that are normally distributed. Therefore, the techinque enables 
us to assess the effect of ‘underlying independent variables of interest’ on the dependent 
variable with particular emphasis on low- medium- and high-‘iron ore exporting’ countries. 
Accordingly, with QR, parameter estimates are derived at multiple points of the conditional 
distributions of ‘iron ore’ exports (Keonker & Hallock, 2001). The QR technique is 
increasingly being employed in development literature, notably in: corruption (Billger & 
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Goel, 2009; Okada & Samreth, 2012; Asongu, 2013), health (Asongu, 2014b) and financial 
(Asongu, 2014c) studies.  
The  th quintile estimator of iron ore exports is obtained by solving for the following 
optimization problem, which is presented without subscripts in Eq. (1) for the purpose of 
simplicity and ease of presentation.   
   






 
 
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



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
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i
ii
i
k
xyii
i
xyii
i
R
xyxy
::
)1(min
                                             (1)
 
Where  1,0 . As opposed to OLS which is fundamentally based on minimizing the sum of 
squared residuals with QR, the weighted sum of absolute deviations are minimised. For 
instance the 25
th
 or 75
th
 quintiles (with  =0.25 or 0.75 respectively) by approximately 
weighing the residuals. The conditional quintile of iron ore exports or iy given ix is: 
 iiy xxQ )/(                                                                                                           (2) 
where unique slope parameters are modelled for each  th specific quintile. This formulation is 
analogous to ixxyE )/( in the OLS slope where parameters are investigated only at the 
mean of the conditional distribution of iron ore exports. For the model in Eq. (2) the 
dependent variable iy  is the ‘iron ore’ exports indicator while ix  contains a constant term, 
trade openness, inflation, infrastructure, exchange rate, political globalisation and 
civil/internal conflicts.  
 Given that the estimation strategy entails interactive regressions, we briefly discuss 
some pitfalls documented by Brambor et al. (2006). Accordingly, all constitutive indicators 
are involved in the specifications. In addition, for the estimations to have economic meaning, 
the estimated coefficients corresponding to the interactive terms are interpreted as conditional 
marginal impacts. In addition, the modifying indicators or foreign aid variables should be 
within the ranges disclosed by the summary statistics for the overall marginal effect to make 
economic sense.  
 
3. Empirical results  
3.1 Presentation of results  
Tables 3 and 4 disclose findings corresponding respectively to bilateral aid and 
multilateral aid.  All the tables entail four-sets of specifications, namely: (i) domestic and 
transnational terrorism modelling in Panel A and (ii) unclear and total terrorism estimations in 
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Panel B.  More specifically, the left-hand-side (LHS) of Panel A (B) displays findings for 
domestic (unclear) terrorism whereas the right-hide-side (RHS) of Panel A (B) shows results 
for transnational (total) terrorism. For either table, we consistently notice that the QR 
estimates are different from the OLS estimates in terms of signs and significance. This further 
supports the relevance of the QR strategy.  
The following findings can be established with respect to Table 3 on linkages between 
iron ore exports, bilateral aid and terrorism indicators. First, but for a slim exception at the 
0.90
th
 quintile for transnational terrorism on the RHS of Panel A, the effects of terrorism are 
overwhelmingly insignificant. Second, bilateral aid consistently has a positive effect with (i) 
an inverted U-shape and (ii) threshold effects of decreasing positive magnitude from the 0.25
th
 
to the 0.90
th
 quintile. Third, on the interaction effects between bilateral aid and terrorism 
indicators, two tendencies are noteworthy: (i) positive impacts with domestic and total 
terrorisms at the 0.50
th
 quintile respectively and (ii) negative effects with transnational 
terrorism at the 0.90
th
 quintile. The corresponding modifying thresholds are within the range 
of bilateral aid provided by the summary statistics, notably 0.765 to 8.362. Accordingly: (i) 
the corresponding positive thresholds are 4.333 (0.013/0.003) for domestic terrorism and 
5.000 (0.010/0.002) for total terrorism while (ii) the negative threshold is 8.352  (0.142/0.017) 
for transnational terrorism. It follows that the amount of bilateral aid required for an overall 
negative effect of transnational terrorism at the 0.90
th
 quintile  is substantially higher than the 
corresponding amount needed for positive thresholds effects from domestic and total 
terrorism at the 0.50
th
 quintile. Fourth, most of the control variables are significant with the 
expected signs. Accordingly, trade openness and infrastructural development are positively 
associated with natural resource exports (Apkan, 2014), while civil conflicts and inflation 
have negative effects. The impact of political globalisation is not significant whereas 
increasing exchange rate reduces iron ore exports. A possible reason for the negative effect of 
exchange rates could be that deteriorating exchange rates are  due to falling prices in 
resources and a cartel of producing-countries agreeing not to increase production to reverse 
the falling prices.  
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Table 3: Iron Ore Exports, Bilateral aid, Terrorism  
             
 Dependent Variable: Iron Ore Exports (Ln) 
             
 Panel A: Domestic Terrorism and Transnational Terrorism   (independent variables) 
     
 Domestic Terrorism (Domter) Transnational Terrorism (Tranater) 
             
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant -4.860* -7.22*** -5.761** -4.368** 1.779 1.097 -4.98** -7.21*** -5.99** -3.423* 2.329 0.869 
 (0.053) (0.003) (0.016) (0.047) (0.502) (0.572) (0.049) (0.002) (0.011) (0.082) (0.406) (0.632) 
Domter 0.002 -0.0001 -0.010 -0.013 0.012 0.010 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.823) (0.981) (0.232) (0.208) (0.509) (0.322)       
Tranater --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.003 -0.0005 0.011 -0.093 0.053 0.142*** 
       (0.595) (0.994) (0.911) (0.231) (0.551) (0.000) 
LnBilaid 0.323*** 0.369*** 0.395*** 0.353*** 0.271** 0.217* 0.319*** 0.370*** 0.464*** 0.309*** 0.341*** 0.261*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.024) (0.010) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.009) (0.000) 
Domter* LnBilaid 0.0004 0.00002 0.002 0.003* -0.001 -0.001 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.820) (0.977) (0.214) (0.075) (0.732) (0.550)       
Tranater* LnBilaid --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.001 0.00008 -0.003 0.017 -0.001 -0.017** 
       (0.894) (0.995) (0.862) (0.215) (0.951) (0.018) 
LnTrade 0.624** 0.210 0.425* 0.524** 0.473 0.411** 0.584** 0.209 0.418* 0.357* 0.339 0.415*** 
 (0.013) (0.372) (0.095) (0.027) (0.109) (0.028) (0.021) (0.375) (0.098) (0.091) (0.265) (0.009) 
LnInflation -0.018 -0.103 -0.036 -0.033 -0.043 0.012 0.002 -0.101* -0.058 -0.049 0.002 0.029 
 (0.820) (0.105) (0.660) (0.708) (0.709) (0.905) (0.974) (0.092) (0.483) (0.530) (0.986) (0.715) 
LnInfrastructure  0.219 1.046*** 0.662*** 0.001 -0.103 -
0.412*** 
0.228 1.047*** 0.740*** -0.002 -0.142 -
0.401*** 
 (0.107) (0.000) (0.000) (0.993) (0.551) (0.001) (0.096) (0.000) (0.000) (0.983) (0.442) (0.001) 
LnXrate (Exchange rate) -
0.068*** 
-
0.105*** 
-
0.128*** 
-
0.093*** 
-0.028 0.017 -
0.069*** 
-
0.105*** 
-
0.126*** 
-
0.095*** 
-0.040 0.006 
 (0.006) (0.001) (0.000) (0.004) (0.477) (0.644) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.307) (0.853) 
Ln (Political globalisation)  0.327 0.410 0.169 0.385 -0.576 0.005 0.391 0.409 0.134 0.379 -0.678 -0.018 
 (0.512) (0.391) (0.733) (0.404) (0.328) (0.991) (0.439) (0.384) (0.782) (0.356) (0.285) (0.968) 
Civil Conflicts  -
0.175*** 
0.092* 0.006 -
0.210*** 
-
0.244*** 
-
0.292*** 
-0.130** 0.092 0.025 -0.101* -0.262*** -
0.290*** 
 (0.001) (0.053) (0.926) (0.002) (0.006) (0.000) (0.012) (0.068) (0.713) (0.092) (0.004) (0.000) 
             
Pseudo R²/R² 0.081 0.184 0.100 0.055 0.060 0.102 0.071 0.184 0.100 0.049 0.049 0.097 
Fisher  5.52***      4.93***      
Observations  457 457 457 457 457 457 457 457 457 457 457 457 
             
 Panel B: Unclear Terrorism and Total Terrorism (independent variables) 
             
 Unclear Terrorism (Unclter) Total Terrorism (Totter) 
   
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant -5.204** -7.27*** -6.57*** -4.002* 1.769 0.817 4.934** -7.22*** -6.39*** -4.235* 1.587 1.007 
 (0.040) (0.002) (0.001) (0.053) (0.481) (0.662) (0.049) (0.003) (0.002) (0.051) (0.558) (0.583) 
Unclter  0.044 -0.001 0.0001 -0.072 0.054 0.042 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.590) (0.975) (0.998) (0.296) (0.663) (0.422)       
Totter --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.002 -0.0001 -0.003 -0.010 0.009 0.005 
       (0.836) (0.981) (0.500) (0.204) (0.552) (0.323) 
LnBilaid 0.331*** 0.369*** 0.453*** 0.357*** 0.306*** 0.174** 0.323*** 0.369*** 0.442*** 0.350*** 0.275** 0.201*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.023) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.030) (0.009) 
Unclter * LnBilaid -0.005 0.0002 -0.001 0.015 -0.004 -0.004 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.690) (0.967) (0.888) (0.206) (0.830) (0.665)       
Totter* LnBilaid --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.0003 0.00002 0.0006 0.002* -0.0007 -0.0004 
       (0.836) (0.977) (0.552) (0.083) (0.802) (0.655) 
LnTrade 0.598** 0.212 0.457** 0.464** 0.376 0.386** 0.626** 0.210 0.455** 0.509** 0.502 0.401** 
 (0.019) (0.383) (0.041) (0.040) (0.187) (0.026) (0.013) (0.372) (0.034) (0.030) (0.105) (0.023) 
LnInflation 0.006 -0.103* -0.053 -0.050 0.060 0.052 -0.014 -0.103 -0.048 -0.040 -0.050 0.027 
 (0.936) (0.073) (0.453) (0.546) (0.601) (0.570) (0.857) (0.105) (0.489) (0.645) (0.667) (0.780) 
LnInfrastructure  0.233* 1.046*** 0.724*** 0.025 -0.106 -
0.443*** 
0.219 1.046*** 0.719*** 0.005 -0.110 -
0.423*** 
 (0.089) (0.000) (0.000) (0.839) (0.530) (0.000) (0.108) (0.000) (0.000) (0.968) (0.536) (0.000) 
LnXrate (Exchange rate) -
0.068*** 
-
0.105*** 
-
0.121*** 
-
0.095*** 
-0.031 -0.001 -
0.068*** 
-
0.105*** 
-
0.122*** 
-
0.093*** 
-0.033 0.011 
 (0.005) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.422) (0.976) (0.005) (0.001) (0.000) (0.004) (0.430) (0.746) 
Ln (Political globalisation)  0.412 0.420 0.244 0.346 -0.587 0.161 0.341 0.410 0.214 0.371 -0.558 0.058 
 (0.413) (0.369) (0.561) (0.423) (0.299) (0.733) (0.494) (0.390) (0.606) (0.415) (0.352) (0.897) 
Civil Conflicts  -0.123** 0.092** 0.037 -0.132** -
0.244*** 
-
0.278*** 
-
0.170*** 
0.092* 0.034 -
0.191*** 
-0.258*** -
0.288*** 
 (0.012) (0.035) (0.502) (0.030) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.057) (0.566) (0.006) (0.007) (0.000) 
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Pseudo R²/R² 0.072 0.184 0.100 0.050 0.050 0.089 0.079 0.184 0.100 0.054 0.059 0.102 
Fisher  5.00***      5.30***      
Observations  457 457 457 457 457 457 457 457 457 457 457 457 
             
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Bilaid: Bilateral aid.  OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² for OLS and Pseudo 
R² for quantile regression. Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where Iron Ore Exports is least. 
 
The following findings can be established with respect to Table 4 on linkages between 
iron ore exports, multilateral aid and terrorism indicators. First, the effect of terrorism is 
consistently positive for: (i) domestic, transnational and total terrorism in the highest quintile 
and (ii) unclear terrorism in the top quintiles. Second, the effect of multilateral aid is positive 
only (i) in the 0.25
th
 quintiles for transnational, unclear and total terrorism related regressions 
and (ii) from the 0.25
th
 to the 0.75
th
 quintiles with decreasing magnitude. Third, the 
interaction effects between multilateral aid and terrorism indicators are only significant in the 
highest quintile for unclear terrorism with a negative sign. The corresponding modifying 
threshold is within the range (-1.249 to 7.105) of multilateral aid provided by the summary 
statistics, notably 5.909 (0.065/0.011). Fourth, most of the significant control variables have 
the expected signs. Accordingly, relative to Table 3, the slim exceptions are that (i) inflation 
is now insignificant and (ii) the effect of political globalization is positive, which is consistent 
with Rudra and Jensen (2011).  
 
Table 4: Iron Ore Exports, Multilateral Aid, Terrorism 
             
 Dependent Variable: Iron Ore Exports 
             
 Panel A: Domestic Terrorism and Transnational Terrorism   (independent variables) 
     
 Domestic Terrorism (Domter) Transnational Terrorism (Tranater) 
             
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant -4.342* -8.371** -5.54*** -3.023 2.432 1.862 -4.467* -8.136** -5.77*** -3.221 3.336 2.214 
 (0.089) (0.026) (0.003) (0.118) (0.186) (0.315) (0.082) (0.027) (0.004) (0.126) (0.249) (0.316) 
Domter 0.002   0.003 0.002 -0.001 0.004 0.003* --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.554) (0.674) (0.512) (0.643) (0.273) (0.050)       
Tranater --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.006 0.006 0.018 -0.022 0.040 0.059*** 
       (0.807) (0.903) (0.529) (0.386) (0.243) (0.000) 
LnMulaid 0.065 0.234 0.242*** 0.143* 0.140* -0.068 0.066 0.221 0.252*** 0.095 0.128 -0.013 
 (0.415) (0.102) (0.004) (0.090) (0.076) (0.293) (0.428) (0.111) (0.007) (0.310) (0.287) (0.868) 
Domter* LnMulaid 0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0001 0.001 0.0005 -0.000 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.609) (0.742) (0.885) (0.145) (0.523) (0.989)       
Tranater* LnMulaid --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.002 0.001 -0.004 0.006 -0.00009 -0.005 
       (0.804) (0.906) (0.647) (0.439) (0.990) (0.221) 
LnTrade 0.578** 0.462 0.520*** 0.249 0.475** 0.337** 0.549** 0.481 0.532** 0.192 0.254 0.323* 
 (0.020) (0.213) (0.008) (0.234) (0.022) (0.041) (0.028) (0.181) (0.012) (0.398) (0.424) (0.082) 
LnInflation -0.027 -0.065 -0.086 -0.093 -0.015 -0.047 -0.014 -0.070 -0.073 -0.078 -0.014 0.010 
 (0.747) (0.502) (0.191) (0.249) (0.853) (0.591) (0.867) (0.461) (0.305) (0.368) (0.908) (0.911) 
LnInfrastructure  0.102 0.941*** 0.592*** -0.039 -0.201 -
0.501*** 
0.107 0.931*** 0.604*** -0.093 -0.193 -0.446*** 
 (0.466) (0.000) (0.000) (0.765) (0.136) (0.001) (0.445) (0.000) (0.000) (0.512) (0.349) (0.002) 
LnXrate (Exchange rate) -0.061** -
0.089*** 
-
0.119*** 
-
0.103*** 
-0.030 0.016 -
0.063*** 
-
0.093*** 
-
0.117*** 
-0.087*** -0.026 0.005 
 (0.020) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.258) (0.661) (0.018) (0.001) (0.000) (0.005) (0.542) (0.860) 
Ln (Political globalisation)  0.633 0.675 0.317 0.701* -0.533 0.332 0.687 0.621 0.336 0.845* -0.515 0.152 
 (0.215) (0.398) (0.427) (0.089) (0.178) (0.456) (0.183) (0.428) (0.436) (0.058) (0.406) (0.774) 
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Civil Conflicts  -0.132** 0.093 0.034 -0.139** -
0.239*** 
-
0.280*** 
-0.094* 0.082 0.042 -0.055 -0.233** -0.272*** 
 (0.021) (0.245) (0.549) (0.022) (0.000) (0.000) (0.080) (0.280) (0.490) (0.389) (0.013) (0.000) 
             
             
Pseudo R²/R² 0.052 0.148 0.078 0.032 0.047 0.096 0.045 0.149 0.078 0.027 0.036 0.089 
Fisher 2.95***      2.80***      
Observations  453 453 453 453 453 453 453 453 453 453 453 453 
             
 Panel B: Unclear Terrorism and Total Terrorism (independent variables) 
             
 Unclear Terrorism (Unclter) Total Terrorism (Totter) 
   
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant -4.715* -8.227** -5.82*** -3.460 2.140 0.530 -4.442* -8.333** -5.74*** -3.063 2.504 1.902 
 (0.069) (0.024) (0.002) (0.102) (0.330) (0.753) (0.082) (0.026) (0.002) (0.158) (0.227) (0.288) 
Unclter  0.038 0.021 0.022 -0.018 0.057* 0.065*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.241) (0.353) (0.301) (0.586) (0.057) (0.001)       
Totter --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.002 0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.003 0.003** 
       (0.494) (0.664) (0.527) (0.701) (0.227) (0.038) 
LnMulaid 0.082 0.235 0.251*** 0.140 0.138 -0.088 0.069 0.234 0.247*** 0.143 0.142 -0.058 
 (0.301) (0.102) (0.003) (0.120) (0.140) (0.132) (0.393) (0.102) (0.004) (0.132) (0.110) (0.370) 
Unclter * LnMulaid -0.006 -0.003 -0.005 0.005 -0.007 -
0.011*** 
--- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.319) (0.434) (0.200) (0.375) (0.219) (0.004)       
Totter* LnMulaid --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0002 0.001 0.0003 -0.00004 
       (0.803) (0.730) (0.782) (0.229) (0.595) (0.915) 
LnTrade 0.552** 0.451 0.529*** 0.286 0.436 0.298* 0.580** 0.461 0.527*** 0.253 0.469** 0.367** 
 (0.030) (0.223) (0.008) (0.217) (0.082) (0.057) (0.020) (0.213) (0.007) (0.284) (0.045) (0.029) 
LnInflation -0.014 -0.070 -0.072 -0.070 -0.001 0.020 -0.025 -0.066 -0.080 -0.090 -0.014 -0.040 
 (0.862) (0.448) (0.273) (0.421) (0.992) (0.772) (0.767) (0.495) (0.221) (0.320) (0.873) (0.652) 
LnInfrastructure  0.108 0.941*** 0.604*** -0.051 -0.249 -
0.557*** 
0.102 0.941*** 0.602*** -0.039 -0.205 -0.477*** 
 (0.441) (0.000) (0.000) (0.717) (0.120) (0.000) (0.464) (0.000) (0.000) (0.788) (0.176) (0.000) 
LnXrate (Exchange rate) -0.063** -
0.092*** 
-
0.115*** 
-
0.096*** 
-0.023 -0.001 -0.062** -
0.090*** 
-
0.116*** 
-0.105*** -0.030 0.020 
 (0.015) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.459) (0.945) (0.018) (0.003) (0.000) (0.002) (0.323) (0.577) 
Ln (Political globalisation)  0.729 0.655 0.352 0.753* -0.419 0.718* 0.651 0.667 0.341 0.706 -0.546 0.267 
 (0.155) (0.403) (0.378) (0.092) (0.369) (0.073) (0.201) (0.402) (0.386) (0.127) (0.220) (0.533) 
Civil Conflicts  -0.086* 0.092 0.044 -0.084 -
0.187*** 
-
0.263*** 
-0.124** 0.093 0.044 -0.141** -
0.239*** 
-0.279*** 
 (0.064) (0.173) (0.361) (0.159) (0.007) (0.000) (0.032) (0.238) (0.441) (0.037) (0.001) (0.000) 
             
             
Pseudo R²/R² 0.046 0.149 0.080 0.027 0.038 0.086 0.050 0.148 0.078 0.031 0.045 0.097 
Fisher 2.87***      2.91***      
Observations  453 453 453 453 453 453 453 453 453 453 453 453 
             
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Mulaid: Multilateral aid. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² for OLS  and 
Pseudo R² for quantile regression. Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where Iron Ore Exports are  least. 
 
3.2 Further discussion and policy implications 
 For brevity, lack of space and in the interests of clarity, we further engage the results 
along three main themes, notably, the: (i) expected positive effect of terrorism in some 
distributions; (ii)  overwhelming positive impact of bilateral aid as opposed to multilateral aid 
and (iii) positive interactions between bilateral aid and some terrorism indicators.  
 First, the results suggest that it is primarily in the countries with the highest levels of 
iron ore exports that terrorism affects exports, especially in ‘multilateral aid’-oriented 
regressions. This implies terrorist activities may exert some positive effects in countries with 
the highest levels of iron ore exports. The causality flowing from terrorism to iron ore exports 
is broadly consistent with the results of De Sousa et al. (2009ab), Richardson (2004) and 
16 
 
Nitsch and Schumacher (2004) on the terrorism-trade nexus discussed in the literature. A 
logical explanation for this unexpected positive effect is that countries with the highest levels 
of iron ore exports may be inclined to increase production in an attempt to boost the much 
needed government revenue essential  for combating rising terrorism. This interpretation may 
also be contingent on the fact that iron ore exports from  countries with the highest level of 
iron ore exports represents a significant part of export and government revenue. It should be 
noted that we have consistently found all terrorism variables to exert a positive influence on 
the dependent variable in countries with the highest levels of iron ore exports.  
 An extension of the interpretation is traceable to the fact that remote terrorist 
incidences may increase investment appetite in iron ore exploration. This is in line with the 
conclusions of De Sousa et al. (2009b) that with remoteness in terror, trade increases. 
Accordingly, this intuition is premised on the logic that the will of some natural resource 
investors to invest in the iron ore industry could be more than proportionate to an underlying 
remote terrorism if expected short- medium- and long-term returns are projected to outweigh 
underlying terrorist risks. Some contemporary parallel examples in other resource industries 
include  (i) growing Chinese investment in Nigeria’s Delta region in spite of growing threats 
from the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) (Obi, 2008) and (ii) the 
Chinese unrelenting presence in South Sudan, despite increasing violence because the country 
accounts for 5% of its crude oil imports (Aguirre, 2014). This interpretation is in accordance 
with Elu and Price (2010) and Asongu and Aminkeng (2013) on Chinese oil diplomacy and 
long-run economic strategy of continuing to engage with countries which are characterised by 
civil conflicts, violence and political strife. As a policy implication, terrorists’ activities do not 
exclusively exert negative effects on resource exports.  
 Second, we have found that relative to multilateral aid, the effects of bilateral aid are 
more significant. Accordingly, the effect of bilateral aid is consistently positive with an 
inverted U-shape and threshold effects of decreasing positive magnitude, whereas multilateral 
aid is overwhelmingly positive only in the 0.25
th
 quintiles. The relative effectiveness of 
bilateral aid which is consistent with Asongu et al. (2015) and Asongu and Kodila-Tedika 
(2015) can be traceable to the political economy of development assistance. Accordingly, 
because the strings related to bilateral aid  require less conflicting development interest, as 
opposed to multilateral aid which may be (i) clouded by conflicts of interest during 
‘consensus building’ among donors  and hence (ii) tailored towards varying donor objectives. 
While a recent survey of the literature has failed to establish differences in development 
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outcomes of multilateral aid vis-à-vis bilateral aid (Biscaye et al., 2015), the intuition of this 
interpretation is consistent with available evidence that former colonial powers who have 
various strategic interests in former colonies may be more effective at allocating foreign aid 
towards the fight against terrorism and the export of natural resources
4
. Recent evidence on 
France’s intervention in Mali, the Central African Republic and exploitation of uranium in 
Niger confirm this position (Melly & Darracq, 2013). As a policy implication, the results 
suggest that bilateral aid has an impact on iron ore export, while the evidence for such a 
relationship between multilateral aid and iron ore exports is limited. 
Third, on interactions between bilateral aid and terrorism indicators, two tendencies 
are noteworthy. They are: (i) positive impacts with domestic and total terrorisms at the 0.50
th
 
quintile respectively and (ii) a negative effect with transnational terrorism at the 0.90
th
 
quintile. Moreover, the interaction effect between multilateral aid and terrorism variables is 
only significant in the highest quintile for unclear terrorism with a negative sign. The 
modifying foreign aid thresholds are within range. This provides limited support for the main 
hypothesis motivating this line of inquiry, notably that foreign can be used to mitigate a 
potentially negative effect of terrorism on resource exports. Such development assistance may 
provide the much needed technical, logistical and financial means essential for  absorbing 
and/or reversing potential negative resource export externalities associated with terrorism. 
The interpretation is consistent with the position of Asongu and Kodila-Tedika (2015a) on 
narratives from Gaibulloev and Sandler (2009) that countries with more financial leverage are 
better equipped to absorb the negative macroeconomic effects of terrorism. A position also 
consistent with Öcal and Yildirim  (2010) and Meierrieks and Gries (2013).  As a policy 
implication, given that the modifying thresholds are within range, bilateral aid may be  
relevant at mitigating the negative effects of domestic and total terrorism on iron ore exports. 
It is important to note that foreign aid would contribute to total financial resources, but it is 
not evident that the aid will be sufficient to make these countries belong to the group of better 
equipped countries.  
                                                          
4
 The position on conflicting donor interest is consistent with the  conclusions of Asongu (2014d)  “Aid is the 
outcome of bargaining in a kind of political market made up of donor aid bureaucracies, multilateral aid 
agencies and recipient government officials. Indeed donors pursue multiple goals and these vary over time. For 
instance, economic gains seem important in Japanese aid, global welfare improvement in Nordic aid and 
political goals in French aid. Hence, few would object to the inference that our findings may also be explained 
by a motivation of the French to maintain their colonial legacies and influence in Africa” (p. 472).  
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 In accordance with the motivation of this line of inquiry which has been partially 
based on comparing the findings with studies in the terrorism literature that have employed 
the same sample and periodicity, we devote some space to discussing how our findings have 
improved insights into linkages between terrorism and macroeconomic variables. First and 
foremost, while Bandyopadhyay et al. (2014) using Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) 
have focused on how development assistance could be relevant in mitigating the negative 
impact of terrorism on FDI.  Their results have been extended by Efobi et al. (2015) and 
Asongu et al. (2015) who have respectively conditioned the baseline analysis on (i) domestic 
corruption-control levels using a more robust GMM strategy and (ii) initial levels of foreign 
direct investment using quintile regressions. Moreover, findings from the last-two studies 
have not been consistent with Bandyopadhyay et al. (2014) on (i) an exclusive negative 
terrorism-FDI and (ii) a positive effect on FDI from the interaction between aid and terrorism.  
This study has improved existing knowledge in the evolving stream of literature by: (i) 
employing iron ore exports as the dependent variable; (ii) partially confirming the findings of 
Bandyopadhyay et al. (2014) in terms the effects of terrorism, foreign aid and their related 
interactions on macroeconomic variables and (iii) validating the results of Efobi et al. (2015) 
and Asongu et al. (2015) only within the spectra of negative interactive impacts and positive 
effect of terrorism on external flows.  
  
4. Concluding implications and further research  
Building on evidence that terrorism reduces trade openness, we have employed 
quantile regressions to assess conditional linkages between foreign aid, iron ore exports and 
terrorism in a panel of 78 developing countries for the period 1984-2008. Bilateral and 
multilateral aid indicators have been used while terrorism has entailed domestic, transnational, 
unclear and total terrorism indicators. The following findings have been established.  First, 
the effect of terrorism is positively significant for the most part in the highest quintiles. 
Second, the effect of bilateral aid is consistently positive with an inverted U-shape and 
threshold effects of decreasing positive magnitude, whereas multilateral aid is 
overwhelmingly positive only in the 0.25
th
 quintiles. Third, interactions between bilateral aid 
and terrorism variables reveal positive impacts with domestic and total terrorisms at the 
median quintiles and negative effects with transnational terrorism at the highest quintile, 
whereas the interaction between multilateral aid and terrorism indicators is only significant 
with a negative sign in the highest quintile for unclear terrorism. The modifying foreign aid 
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thresholds that are within range further confirm the relevance of bilateral aid in mitigating the 
negative effects of domestic and total terrorism on iron ore exports. Justifications for 
unexpected signs have been are discussed.  
Three policy implications are apparent. First, terrorists’ activities do not exclusively 
exert negative effects on resource exports. Second, bilateral aid has an impact on iron ore 
exports, while the evidence for such a relationship between multilateral aid and iron ore 
exports is limited. Third, given that the modifying thresholds are within range, bilateral aid is 
relevant at mitigating the negative effects of domestic and total terrorism on iron ore exports. 
In the light of the discussed findings, there is evidently room for future research in (i) 
understanding mechanisms by which terrorism positively and negatively affects iron ore 
exports and (ii) distinguishing aid by sectors to improve insights into which aid-specific 
categories are most relevant in the established linkages.  
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Appendix  
Correlation Matrix 
              
LnIOExp LnTrade LnTel LnInflation LnXrate LnBilad LnMulaid Domter Tranater Unclter Totter LnPolglob Civcon  
1.000 0.103 0.080 -0.001 -0.055 0.126 0.025 0.049 0.0007 -0.001 0.040 0.109 -0.079 LnIOExp 
 1.000 0.296 -0.230 0.043 -0.267 -0.289 -0.236 -0.206 -0.240 -0.246 -0.122 -0.299 LnTrade 
  1.000 -0.121 -0.191 -0.376 -0.514 0.023 0.072 -0.003 0.026 0.268 -0.183 LnTel 
   1.000 -0.284 -0.047 -0.023 0.171 0.164 0.091 0.169 -0.150 0.185 LnInflation 
    1.000 0.114 0.183 -0.081 -0.001 -0.050 -0.073 0.089 -0.120 LnXrate 
     1.000 0.721 0.116 0.088 0.093 0.117 0.233 0.259 LnBilaid 
      1.000 0.014 -0.039 0.069 0.016 0.167 0.194 LnMulaid 
       1.000 0.743 0.733 0.993 0.127 0.428 Domter 
        1.000 0.528 0.785 0.120 0.418 Tranater 
         1.000 0.789 0.072 0.347 Unclter 
          1.000 0.126 0.441 Totter 
           1.000 -0.024 LnPolglob 
            1.000 Civcon 
              
LnIOIxp: Iron Ore Export.  LnTrade: Trade Openness.  LnTel: Number of Telephone lines. LnXrate: Exchange rate.  LnBilaid: Bilateral aid. LnMulaid: Multilater aid.  Domter: Number of Domestic terrorism incidents.  
Tranater: Number of Transnational terrorism incidents. Unclter: Number of terrorism incidents whose category in unclear.  Totter: Total number of terrorism incidents.   LnPolglob: Index of political globalisation. 
Civcon:  Index of internal civil conflicts.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21 
 
References  
Abadie, A., & Gardeazabal, J., (2008. “Terrorism and the world economy”, European 
Economic Review, 52(1), pp.1-27. 
 
Aguirre, I., (2014). “Violence in South Sudan Threatens Chinese Oil Investment”, Global 
Risk Insights  
http://oilprice.com/Energy/Crude-Oil/Violence-In-South-Sudan-Threatens-Chinese-Oil-
Investment.html (Accessed: 11/07/2015).  
 
Akinwale, A. K., (2010). “Integrating the traditional and the modern conflict management 
strategies in Nigeria”, Department of Sociology, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of 
Ibadan, Nigeria. 
 
Akpan, U., (2014). “Impact of Regional Road Infrastructure Improvement on Intra-Regional 
Trade in ECOWAS”, African Development Review, 16(S1), pp. 64-76.  
 
Amavilah, V. H., (2015). “Social Obstacles to Technology, Technological Change, and the 
Economic Growth of African Countries: Some Anecdotal Evidence from Economic History”, 
MPRA Paper No. 63273. 
 
Anderson, M., (2015), “Global cost of conflict reaches $14.3 tn, says report” , The guardian,  
http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/jun/16/global-cost-conflict-reaches-
14tn-says-report (Accessed: 27/06/2015).  
 
Asongu, S. A., (2013). “Fighting corruption in Africa: do existing corruption-control levels 
matter?”, International Journal of Development Issues, 12(1), pp. 36-52.  
 
Asongu, S. A., (2014a). “Globalization (fighting), corruption and development: How are these 
phenomena linearly and nonlinearly related in wealth effects?”, Journal of Economic Studies, 
3(3), pp. 346-369.  
 
Asongu, S. A., (2014b). “The impact of health worker migration on development dynamics: 
evidence of wealth effects from Africa”, The European Journal of Health Economics, 15(2), 
pp. 187-201.  
 
Asongu, S. A., (2014c). “Financial development dynamics thresholds of financial 
globalisation: evidence from Africa”, Journal of Economic Studies, 41(2), pp. 166-195.  
 
Asongu, S. A., (2014d). “The Questionable Economics of Development Assistance in Africa: 
Hot-Fresh Evidence, 1996-2010”, The Review of Black Political Economy, 41(4), pp.  455-
480.   
 
Asongu, S. A., (2015). “Drivers of Growth in Fast Emerging Economies: A Dynamic 
Instrumental Quantile Approach”, African Governance and Development Institute Working 
Paper No. 15/009, Yaoundé.  
 
Asongu, S. A., & Aminkeng, G. A. A., (2013). “The economic consequences of China-Africa 
relations: debunking myths in the debate”, Journal of Chinese Economic and Business 
Studies, 11(4), pp. 261-277. 
22 
 
 
Asongu, S. A., Efobi, U., & Beecroft, I., (2015). “FDI, Aid, Terrorism: Conditional Threshold 
Evidence from Developing Countries”, African Governance and Development Institute 
Working Paper  No. 15/019, Yaoundé. 
 
Asongu, S. A., & Kodila-Tedika, O., (2015a). “Trade, Aid and Terror”, African Governance 
and Development Institute Working Paper  No. 15/028, Yaoundé. 
 
Asongu, S. A., & Kodila-Tedika, O., (2015b). “Is Poverty in the African DNA (Gene)?”, 
African Governance and Development Institute Working Paper  No. 15/011, Yaoundé. 
 
Asongu, S. A., & Kodila-Tedika, O., (2016). “Fighting African Conflicts and Crime: Which 
Governance Tools Matter?”, International Journal of Social Economics: 43(5), pp. 466-485.  
 
Asongu, S. A., & Nwachukwu, J. C., (2015a). “Revolution empirics: predicting the Arab 
Spring”, Empirical Economics:  
DOI: 10.1007%2Fs00181-015-1013-0 
 
Asongu, S. A., & Nwachukwu, J. C., (2015b). “Fighting terrorism: empirics on policy 
harmonization”, African Governance and Development Institute Working Paper  No. 15/024, 
Yaoundé. 
 
Asongu, S. A., & Nwachukwu, J. C., (2016). “The Role of Lifelong Learning in Political 
Stability and Non-violence: Evidence from Africa”, Journal of Economic Studies, 43(1), pp. 
141-164.  
 
Bandyopadhyay, S.,  Sandler, T., & Younas, J., (2014). “Foreign direct investment, aid, and 
terrorism”, Oxford Economic Papers, 66(1), pp. 25-50. 
 
Beets, S. D., (2005). “Understanding the Demand-Side Issues of International Corruption.” 
Journal of Business Ethics, 57 (1), pp. 65-81. 
 
Bell, S. R.,  Clay, K. C., Murdie,  A., & Piazza, J., (2014). “Opening Yourself Up: The Role 
of External and Internal Transparency in Terrorism Attacks”, Political Research Quarterly:  
doi:10.1177/1065912914527798.  
 
Billger, S. M., & Goel, R. K., (2009), “Do existing corruption levels matter in controlling 
corruption? Cross-country quantile regression estimates”, Journal of Development 
Economics, 90, pp. 299-305. 
 
Biscaye, P., Harris, K. P., Reynolds, T., & Anderson, C. L., (2015). “Relative Effectiveness of 
Bilateral and Multilateral Aid on Development and Social Outcomes”, Evans School of Policy 
Analysis and Research (EPAR) Brief  No. 294, Seattle, Washington.  
 
Black, D., (1990). The elementary  forms of conflict management. New York, Plenum Press. 
 
Borg, M. J., (1992). “Conflict management in the modern world-system”. Sociological 
Forum, 7(2), pp. 261-282. 
 
23 
 
Brambor, T., Clark, W. M., & Golder, M., (2006), “Understanding Interaction Models: 
Improving Empirical Analyses”, Political Analysis, 14 (1), pp. 63-82.  
 
Brockhoff, S., Kieger, T., & Meierrieks, D., (2014). “Great Expectations and Hard Times - 
The (Nontrivial) Impact of Education on Domestic Terrorism”, Journal of Conflict 
Resolution: doi: 10.1177/0022002713520589.  
 
Caulderwood, K., (2015) “Sub-Saharan Africa Falls Behind In Fight Against Extreme 
Poverty: World Bank Report”, International Business Times (April 14th 2015). 
http://www.ibtimes.com/sub-saharan-africa-falls-behind-fight-against-extreme-poverty-
world-bank-report-1881460  (Accessed: 19/04/2015). 
 
Choi, S-W., (2015). “Economic growth and terrorism: domestic, international, and suicide”, 
Oxford Economic Papers, 67(1), pp. 157-181.  
 
Choi, S-W., (2010). “Fighting Terrorism through the Rule of Law?”, The Journal of Conflict 
Resolution,  54(6), pp. 940-966. 
 
Choi, S-W., & Salehyan , I., (2013). “No Good Deed Goes Unpunished: Refugees, 
Humanitarian Aid, and Terrorism”, Conflict Management and Peace Sciences, 30(1), pp. 53-
75. 
 
Costa, A., Hermandez, M., & Sebastian-Gallés, N., (2008). “Bilingualism aids conflict 
resolution: Evidence from the ANT task”, Cognition, 106 (1), pp. 59-86. 
 
De Sousa, J., Mirza, D., & Verdier, T., (2009a), “Trade and the Spillovers of Transnational 
Terrorism”, Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics, 145 (4), pp. 453-461. 
 
De Sousa, J., Mirza, D., & Verdier, T., (2009b), “Terrorism Networks and Trade: Does the 
Neighbor Hurt?”, CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7946. 
 
Easterly, W., (1999. “The Ghost of Financing Gap: Testing the Growth Model Used in the 
International Financial Institutions”, Journal of Development Economics, 60, pp. 423-438. 
 
Enders, W., &  Sandler T., (2006). The Political Economy of Terrorism. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Enders W, Sandler T & Gaibulloev K., (2011). “Domestic versus transnational terrorism: 
Data, decomposition, and dynamics”. Journal of Peace Research, 48(3), pp. 319–337. 
 
Efobi, U., Asongu, S., & Beecroft, I., (2015). “Foreign Direct Investment, Aid and Terrorism: 
Empirical Insight Conditioned on Corruption Control”, African Governance and Development 
Institute Working Paper No. 15/007, Yaoundé.  
 
Elu, J. U., & Price, G. N., (2010). “Does China Transfer Productivity Enhancing Technology 
to Sub-Saharan Africa? Evidence from Manufacturing Firms”, African Development Review, 
22(1), pp. 587-598. 
 
24 
 
Feridun, M., & Shahbaz, M.,  (2010). “Fighting Terrorism: Are Military Measures Effective? 
Empirical Evidence from Turkey”, Defence & Peace Economics, 21(2), pp. 193-205.  
 
Forbes (2014). “The Latest Iron Ore Price Slump: Causes And Effects”, Forbes/Investing, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2014/03/14/the-latest-iron-ore-price-slump-
causes-and-effects/#fad3ef06949d (Accessed: 19/04/2016).  
 
Gaibulloev, K., & Sandler, T.,  (2009). “The impact of terrorism and conflicts on growth in 
Asia”, Economics and Politics, 21(3), pp. 359-383.  
 
Gailbulloev, K., Sandler, T., & Santifort, C., (2012). “Assessing the Evolving Threat of 
Terrorism”, Global Policy, 3(2), pp. 135-144. 
 
Gardner, K. L., (2007). “Fighting Terrorism the FATF Way”. Global Governance: A Review 
of Multilateralism and International Organisation, 13(3), pp. 325-345. 
 
Gries, T., Krieger, T., & Meierrieks, D., (2011). “Causal Linkages Between Domestic 
Terrorism and Economic Growth”, Defence and Peace Economics, 22(5), pp. 493-508.  
 
Heyneman, S. P., (2002). “Defining the Influence of Education on Social Cohesion”, 
International Journal of Educational Policy, Research and Practice, 3(4), pp. 73-97. 
 
Heyneman, S. P., (2008a). “Education, social cohesion and ideology. In Right to Education: 
Policies and Perspectives, edited by Emin Karip, 89-104. Ankara: Turkish Education 
Association. 
 
Heyneman, S. P., (2008b). “Buying your way into Heaven: The corruption of education 
systems in global perspective.”, Perspectives on Global Issues, 2 (1), pp. 1-8. 
 
Hoffman, A. M., Shelton, C., & Cleven, E., (2013). “Press Freedom, Publicity, and the Cross-
National Incidence of Transnational Terrorism”, Political Research Quarterly, 66(4),  pp. 
896-909.  
 
Humphreys, M., (2005). “Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution. Uncovering 
the Mechanisms”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 49 (4), pp. 508-537. 
 
International Country Risk Guide. (2010) The political risk services group, available at 
http://www.prsgroup.com/icrg.aspx  (Accessed 10 October 2010). 
 
Koenker, R., & Hallock, F.K., (2001), “Quantile regression”, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 15, pp.143-156. 
 
Koh, W. T. H., (2007). “Terrorism and its impact on economic growth and technological 
innovation”, Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 74(2), pp. 129-138.  
 
Le Roux, S., & Kelsey, D., (2015a). “Dragon Slaying with Ambiguity: Theory and 
Experiments”, Sara le Roux, Department of Economics, Oxford Brookes University. 
 
Le Roux, S., & Kelsey, D., (2015b). “Strategic Substitutes, Complements and Ambiguity: An 
25 
 
Experimental Study”, Department of Economics, Oxford Brookes University. 
 
Meierrieks, D., & Gries, T., (2013). “Causality between terrorism and economic growth”, 
Journal of Peace Research, 50(1), pp. 91-104.  
 
Melly, P.,  & Darracq, V., (2013). “A New Way to Engage? French Policy in Africa from 
Sarkozy to Hollande”, Catham House, Africa 2013/01, London. 
 
Mirza, D., & Verdier, T., (2008), “International trade, security and transnational terrorism: 
Theory and a survey of empirics”, Journal of Comparative Economics, 36(2), pp. 179-194.  
 
Nitsch, V., & Schumacher, D., (2004), “Terrorism and international trade: an empirical 
investigation”,  European Journal of Political Economy, 20(2), pp. 423-433.  
 
Öcal, N., and Yildirim, J., (2010). “Regional effects of terrorism on economic growth in 
Turkey: A geographically weighted regression approach”, Journal of Peace Research, 47(4), 
pp. 477-489.  
 
Okada, K., & Samreth, S.,(2012), “The effect of foreign aid on corruption: A quantile 
regression approach”, Economic Letters, 115(2), pp. 240-243. 
 
Oreopoulos, P., & Salvanes, K. G., (2009). “How Large are Returns to Schooling? Hint: 
Money Isn’t Everything.”, NBER Working Paper No. 15339. 
 
Piazza, J. A., (2006). “Rooted in Poverty?: Terrorism, Poor Economic Development, and 
Social Cleavages”, Terrorism and Political Violence, 18(1), pp. 159-177. 
 
Piazza, J. A., (2011), “The illicit drug trade, counternarcotics strategies and terrorism”, Public 
Choice, 149(3-4), pp. 297-314. 
 
Piazza, J. A., (2012), “The Opium Trade and Patterns of Terrorism in the Provinces of 
Afghanistan: An Empirical Analysis”, Terrorism and Political Violence, 24(2), pp. 213-234. 
 
Price, G. N.,  & Elu, J. U., (2016), “Global Warming And Cross-State Islamist Terrorism In 
Nigeria”,  Department of Economics, Morehouse College, Atlanta GA.  
 
Richardson, M., (2004), “A Time Bomb for Global Trade: Maritime-related Terrorism in an 
Age of Weapons of Mass Destruction”, Maritime Studies, Volume 2004 (134), pp. 1-8.  
 
Rodrik, D., (2008). “The Real Exchange Rate and Economic Growth”, Harvard University,  
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/drodrik/Research%20papers/RER%20and%20growth.pdf 
(Accessed: 29/04/2015). 
 
Rudra, N., & Jensen, N. M., (2011). “Globalisation and the Politics of Natural Resources”, 
Comparative Political Studies, 44(6), pp. 639-661.   
Shahbaz, M., Shahbaz, S., M., Nasir, M. M., & Edward, W. M., (2013). “An analysis of a 
causal relationship between economic growth and terrorism in Pakistan”, Economic 
Modelling, 35(September), pp. 21-29.  
26 
 
 
Shahzad, S. J. H., Zakaria, M., Rehman, M. U., Ahmed, T., & Fida, B. A.,  (2015) 
“Relationship Between FDI, Terrorism and Economic Growth in Pakistan: Pre and Post 9/11 
Analysis”, Social Indicators Research, (March, 2015) 
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11205-015-0950-5  
 
Singh, P., (2001). “Punjab Terrorism: Truth Still Uncovered”, Economic and Political 
 Weekly, 36 (40), pp. 3829-3831. 
 
Singh, P., (2007). “The Political Economy of the Cycles of Violence and Non-violence 
 in the Sikh Struggle for Identity and Political Power: implications for Indian federalism”, 
Third World Quarterly, 28(3), pp. 555-570. 
 
Thomas, K.W., (1992). Conflict and negotiation processes in organisations. In: Dunnette, 
M.D. and L.M. Hough eds. Handbook of industrial and organisational psychology. Palo Alto, 
CA, Consulting Psychologists Press. pp. 651–717. 
 
Volkema, R. J., & Bergmann, T. J., (1995). “Conflict styles as indicators of behavioural 
patterns in interpersonal conflicts”. The Journal of Social Psychology, 135 (1), pp. 5-15. 
 
World Bank (2015). “World Development Indicators’, World Bank Publications  
http://www.gopa.de/fr/news/world-bank-release-world-development-indicators-2015  
(Accessed: 25/04/2015).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
